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Abstract
An increasingly number of low- and middle-income countries have developed and implemented a national policy
towards universal coverage of healthcare for their citizens over the past decade. Among them is China which has
expanded its population coverage by health insurance from around 29.7% in 2003 to over 90% at the end of 2010.
While both central and local governments in China have significantly increased financial inputs into the two newly
established health insurance schemes: new cooperative medical scheme (NCMS) for the rural population, and
urban resident basic health insurance (URBMI), the cost of healthcare in China has also been rising rapidly at the
annual rate of 17.0%% over the period of the past two decades years. The total health expenditure increased from
74.7 billion Chinese yuan in 1990 to 1998 billion Chinese yuan in 2010, while average health expenditure per
capital reached the level of 1490.1 Chinese yuan per person in 2010, rising from 65.4 Chinese yuan per person in
1990. The repaid increased population coverage by government supported health insurance schemes has
stimulated a rising use of healthcare, and thus given rise to more pressure on cost control in China.
There are many effective measures of supply-side and demand-side cost control in healthcare available. Over the
past three decades China had introduced many measures to control demand for health care, via a series of co-
payment mechanisms. The paper introduces and discusses new initiatives and measures employed to control cost
escalation of healthcare in China, including alternative provider payment methods, reforming drug procurement
systems, and strengthening the application of standard clinical paths in treating patients at hospitals, and analyses
the impacts of these initiatives and measures. The paper finally proposes ways forward to make universal health
coverage in China more sustainable.
Introduction
An increasingly number of low- and middle-income coun-
tries have developed and implemented a national strategy
and policy towards universal coverage of healthcare for
their citizens over the past decade [1,2]. In so doing,
national governments, employers and individual citizens
have increased their investments on health and health
care, aiming to increase population coverage, improve
access to quality health care, and reduce financial risks
for patients in seeking care. One challenge facing many
countries is that people are living longer than they used
to, owing to improved living standard, advanced health
technology, better education, etc. In addition, high-
technologies developed to advance healthcare in recent
decades have also resulted in people’s higher expectations
on health care. In the meantime, people are less active
physically nowadays than they used to be, due to changes
in the nature of working and life styles, resulting in more
non-communicable chronically diseases (NCD). All these
have been leading to the increasing needs of healthcare.
Implementing universal health coverage, through either
social health insurance, or national health services, would
have to increase potential demands for healthcare, and
thus the cost of healthcare may be rising more rapidly
than the economic growth seen in many countries. That
has led governments and employers, as well as individuals,
to be more concerned about affordability to pay for health
care. Therefore, controlling cost escalation of healthcare
is always one of great challenges in scaling up the
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“Value for money” is one of important topics in discussing
and debating how countries can make universal health
coverage more sustainable.
Since early 2000s the Government of China has ser-
iously considered its social development after its rapid
economic growth in 1980s and 90s. President Hu Jingtao
and Premier Wen Jiabao have paid more attentions to
the welfare of the Chinese population than the previous
political leaderships which had seen the rapid growth of
gross domestic products (GDP) as the top priority in
China. Like many other developing countries, main
sources of finance for healthcare in China come from
central and local government funding, employers’ contri-
bution to urban employee health insurance scheme, and
individuals’ out of pocket payments including premium
payment, co-insurance payment, etc. In late 2002, the
Government of China decided to start to re-establish its
rural health insurance scheme, named New Rural Medi-
cal Cooperative Scheme (NCMS), with financial supports
from both central and local governments [3]. Central and
local governments allocated RMB 20 yuan per rural resi-
dent in 2003 to support the NCMS, while individuals
were required to contribute RMB 10 yuan/person. The
financial support from governments and individual pre-
mium has now reached a level of at least RMB230 yuan
p e rp e r s o ni n2 0 1 1 ,o fw h i c hg o v e r n m e n ts u b s i d i e s
accounted for around 80%. All the Chinese rural resi-
dents are eligible to enrol the scheme. Building upon
what the Chinese government has done in the rural
areas, the government in 2007 decided to launch urban
resident basic health insurance (URBHI), trying to cover
those urban population who are not covered by urban
employee basic health insurance (UEBHI). Over the past
decade, UEBHI, a social health insurance scheme jointly
funded by employers and employees, has also been
strengthened, covering more employees from public and
private sectors than ever. By 2010, NCMS has now cov-
ered 834 million rural residents, while urban employee
BMI and urban resident health insurance covered 429
million urban population by the end of 2010, i.e. over
90% of the Chinese population have now got health
insurance coverage. Figure 1 would display the changing
tendency of population covered by the health insurance
from the year of 2004 to 2010.
As a result of this new development, access to healthcare
in China has to some extent been improved in recent
years. The cost of healthcare in China has been rising
rapidly at the annual rate of 17.0% over the period of the
past two decades. The total health expenditure increased
from RMB 74.7 billion yuan in 1990 to 1,998 billion yuan
in 2010 [4]. Average expenditure per hospital admission
and per outpatient visit has increased at an annual rate
that was by far much quicker than the average rate of
GDP growth. Such a rapid rise may be partly attributed by
meeting unmet needs of healthcare for the vulnerable
groups, and partly owing to moral hazards associated with
both demand for, and supply of, healthcare in China. A
rapid increase of household income level in recent years
may have also played a role in demand for higher quality
healthcare in China. The Governments of China at
national and local levels has recognized the issue of rapid
cost escalation of healthcare, and many policy instruments
and reforms have been implemented. These reforms, often
through piloting studies, include: improved regulation of
drug prices, development of new essential drug lists, using
alternative provider payment methods, improving the pro-
curements of drugs and other health technologies, and
regulating the uses of high technologies. The main pur-
poses of this paper are to present firstly the cost escalation
of healthcare and its influencing factors in China, and
then introduce and discuss initiatives employed to control
cost escalation of healthcare in China, and analyse its pros
and cons of such strategies. The paper ends with discus-
sion on how China can learn from other countries to
make its universal health coverage more sustainable.
Healthcare cost escalation and its influencing
factors
The cost escalation of healthcare has been one of hot
topics in reforming national health systems for many
decades. It has been also centred in the discussion and
debates of China’s health care system reform over the
past three decades [5]. According to the national health
account studies, the increase rate of health care costs in
China has also been by far faster than the rate of eco-
nomic growth over the period [6]. The average growth
rate of healthcare over the past decade has been slowed
d o w n ,b u ts t i l la t1 5 % .F i g u r e2w o u l dd e m o n s t r a t et h e
cost escalation of healthcare since China enters the 21
st
century, from two perspectives of total health expendi-
ture and growth rate. The total health expenditures are
paid for from three categories: government health expen-
diture, social health expenditure, and out of pocket
expenditure. Over the past decade, the shares of the gov-
ernment health expenditure and social health expendi-
ture have, respectively, risen from 15.5% and 25.6% in
2000, to 27.2% and 34.6% in 2009 (Table 1). As many stu-
dies reported, the government funding appropriated to
the Chinese health facilities (e.g. public hospitals, primary
health care centres, etc.) has relatively declined, since the
early 1980s. A vast majority of Chinese health facilities
have had to rely on service fees and profits from drug
sale to generate revenues to cover their operational costs
[7]. Worse is that the income of many Chinese health
professionals, and other health staff welfare programmes,
are linked to the extents of their abilities to generate rev-
enues for their institutions [5].
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Figure 2 Cost escalation of healthcare since China enters the 21
st century in terms of total health expenditure and growth rate.
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in China to pay health providers for the services pro-
vided, while government health budget allocated to pub-
lic-owned health facilities, albeit being less important
until recently, has been another main provider payment
method. There are over 4,000 fee items in the FFS in
China. Under such a circumstance, FFS has provided
the doctors and hospitals in China with strong financial
incentives for over provision of expensive health ser-
vices. Total health expenditure is determined by prices
of services and goods (e.g. drug prices), and volume of
service use. The prices of services are often associated
with input costs, nature of service providers (e.g. profit
vs. non-profit), and other factors, while the rates of ser-
vice use are associated with health insurance, individual
income level, perceived health needs, structure of popu-
lation, etc. As pointed out by the World Bank and other
studies, FFS financial incentives for health service provi-
ders, together with weak regulation of health service
providers, have led to over-use and unnecessary treat-
ments and drug prescriptions. The national health ser-
vices survey undertaken in 2008 reported that
unnecessary hospital admission might be as high as 30%
nationally [8]. This could be partially contributed to a
significant rise in numbers of outpatient visits and inpa-
tient hospital admissions from 2002 to 2010, as shown
in Table 2. While the number of Chinese population
has not changed much over the period, the number of
outpatient visits and hospital admissions increased from
21.5 trillions and 59 millions in 2002 to 58.4 trillions
and 141.7 millions, respectively. It is reasonably believed
that the rapid expanded population coverage by the
health insurance schemes, hugely subsidized by the cen-
tral and local governments in China, did play a role in
such an increase of health service uses. Moral hazards
have inevitably been associated with some unnecessary
use of limited health resources, as the first author of the
paper witnessed that some township health centres
admitted patients with minor illnesses for hospitaliza-
tion. Such a rapid increase of healthcare use has a huge
implication for cost escalation of health care in China.
As described in the introduction section, three main-
stream health insurance schemes in China have been
developed rapidly in recent years, covering a vast major-
ity of the Chinese population. URBHI and NCMS are
jointly funded by national/local governments and indivi-
duals, while UEBHI is jointly supported by employers
and employees. The resource pooling and risk-sharing
level varies from place to place, but most of the health
insurance schemes in China are at county/district level,
and some at city/municipal level. The management cen-
tres of these schemes have been responsible to develop
service benefit packages based on the guidelines issued
from central government. They have also started to play
a modest role in cost control of healthcare, mainly in
the area of developing alternative payment methods to
health service providers, although FFS is still the most
common method used in China, as said above.
Cost control initiatives in China and their impacts
Containing the cost of health care has become one of
main objectives of virtually all national health systems
around the world - both high-income and low- and mid-
dle-income countries. Over the past decades, the high-
income countries have developed many measures to
tackle the cost escalation of health care. These measures
target either demand side or supply side. Among the
measures targeting the demand side are co-payments
(e.g. deductable and co-insurance payments and ceiling),
limited benefit packages, etc, while those targeting supply
side include the use of different provider payment meth-
ods, (e.g. capitation, DRG payment, capped global bud-
get), regulation of drug and service prices, controlling the
use of high-technologies, etc. All these measures do have
Table 1 Who have paid for healthcare in China
Year Government health expenditure Social health expenditure Out-of-pocket health expenditure
Level
(100 million
Yuan)
As percentage of health
expenditure
Level
(100 million
Yuan)
As percentage of health
expenditure
Level
(100 million
Yuan)
As percentage of health
expenditure
2000 710 15 1,172 26 2,705 59
2001 801 16 1,211 24 3,014 60
2002 909 16 1,539 27 3,342 58
2003 1,117 17 1,789 27 3,679 56
2004 1,294 17 2,225 29 4,071 54
2005 1,553 18 2,586 30 4,521 52
2006 1,779 18 3,211 33 4,854 49
2007 2,582 22 3,894 34 5,099 40
2008 3,594 25 5,066 35 5,876 40
2009 4,686 27 5,948 35 6,571 38
Source of data: The Chinese Ministry of Health: China Health Statistics Yearbook of 2010. Beijing: 2010
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tions for equity in access to healthcare, and efficiency of
service provision, as well as quality of care. Therefore a
balance in using the combination of the measures needs
to be found.
In tackling the cost escalation of health care in 1980s
and 90s, there seems a trend in China that the measures
targeting service users were more easily introduced and
implemented than the measures targeting service suppli-
ers. For example, in reforming UEBHI, high deductable
and co-insurance payment, as well as reimbursement
ceiling was introduced as early as in late 1980s. So were
the limited service benefit packages which defined which
services or drugs are reimbursable or not. In the mean-
while, although great efforts were made to introduce
alternative provider payment methods to FFS, it was less
successful, particularly in a large scale. This may owe lar-
gely to the fact that the service users have weak political
voices than the service providers and other key stake-
holders (such as national and international pharmaceuti-
cal manufactures) in China. Furthermore, even if the
government did take some cost controlling measures tar-
geting service providers and medical suppliers, the effects
were often comprised because of coping strategies devel-
oped by the supply side. For example, the National
Reform and Development Commission, a government
authority responsible for pricing regulation, among
others, has since the 1990s regulated (mainly reduced)
the prices of drugs over 20 times. Once such policies and
measures were implemented, many pharmaceutical man-
ufactures stopped the production of drugs that have to
be priced lower than what they expected, while doctors
and hospitals in China were less likely to use these drugs,
as such policies and measures would affect profit making
and revenue generation [9]. Both central and local gov-
ernments in China have been fully aware of the problems
and challenges in addressing the cost escalation of
healthcare. Many policy initiatives have been put in place
to use limited resources more efficiently. This section
would introduce several emerging initiatives of cost con-
trol targeting the supply side of healthcare markets in
China and examine their effects.
Using mixed provider payment methods
Provider payment methods consist of retrospective (e.g.
FFS, case-based/DRG, and unit flat rate), prospective
(e.g. salary, capitation, and global budget), and mixed
payment methods. Different provider payment methods
have different advantages and disadvantages in terms of
cost and quality of healthcare. An increasing number of
countries are in favour of using mixed payment methods
to control rapid escalation of healthcare cost. Using
alternative provider payment methods to FFS in China
has always been a great challenge. Over the years,
NCMS, UEBHI and URBHI in some cities/counties of
China have been trying to use case-based payment or
flat unit rates to pay outpatient visits and hospital
admissions. In some cities, global budget was used to
pay for defined number of hospital admissions. Case-
based payment system is one of main national initiatives
developed to tackle the cost escalation of healthcare,
among other issues. In 2004, the Ministry of Health,
China endorsed a policy that supports experiments in
the application of case-based payment system in China.
Since then an increasing number of provincial health
authorities have decided to pilot this provider payment
method, although such a payment reform had been seen
in several cities of China before. A common problem
with case-based payments is often the limited number
of diseases covered. If too few diseases are covered, the
overall impact on cost control at a hospital level is most
modest. Hence, many health insurance schemes in dif-
ferent cities/counties of China have adopted flat unit
rates for an outpatient visit or/and inpatient admission
Table 2 Number of outpatient visits and inpatient admissions by level of health institution in China (2002-2010)
Year Total population (100,000,000) Total Hospitals Community health
centres
Township health
centres
Total OP
visits
(100,000,000)
Total IP admissions
(10,000)
OP
(100,000,000)
IP
(10,000)
OP
(100,000,000)
IP
(10,000)
OP
(100,000,000)
IP
(10,000)
2002 12.85 21.45 5,991 12.43 3,997 11 7.1 1,625
2003 12.92 20.96 6,092 12.13 4,159 0.38 10 6.91 1,608
2004 13.00 22.03 6,669 13.05 4,668 0.46 15 7.03 1,621
2005 13.08 23.05 7,184 13.87 5,108 0.59 27 6.79 1,622
2006 13.14 24.47 7,906 14.71 5,562 0.83 44 7.25 1,858
2007 13.21 33.32 9,827 16.38 6,487 2.26 107 7.59 2,662
2008 13.28 35.3 11,483 17.81 7,392 2.57 141 8.62 3,355
2009 13.35 54.88 13,256 19.22 8,488 3.77 225 8.77 3,808
2010 13.40 58.4 14,174 20.4 9,524
Source of Data: The Chinese Ministry of Health: China Health Statistics Yearbook of 2010. Beijing: 2010
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ment can simplify the management procedures and
would have an overall impact on the total health expen-
diture. Global budget has also increasingly been used to
ensure that the health insurance funds would not get
into deficits. We have selected three cities in China:
Shanghai in the east-coast), Shenzhen in the southern,
and Mudanjiang in the north-east to look at what these
cities have done in reforming their provider payment
methods in order to tackle the rapid cost escalation of
health care, among others.
Table 3 introduces main provider payment methods
used in the three cities, and other key measures adopted
to complement the effort of cost control. It also presents
their impacts on overall cost control of health care and
the balance of health insurance funds. As we can see, all
the three cities have used more than one provider pay-
ment method to pay for outpatient and inpatient services.
O n ek e ym e s s a g ef r o mt h et a b l ei st h a t ,e x c e p taf e w
situations, all the three cities have tried to use alternative
methods to FFS. FFS, as the most popular method used
over the past decades, has been associated with the rapid
cost escalation of health care in China and other coun-
tries. The results show that either case-based payment, or
using flat unit rate to pay for OP and IP services, or
global budget, have produced positive impacts on cost
control of health care in the three cities. Other measures
on rational use of drugs and high-tech, as well as
strengthening service referring system might have also
been attributed to slow down of cost escalation in these
cities. While these alternative provider payment methods
did produce the results that the Chinese policy-makers
and health insurance fund managers wanted to see, there
have also been problems and challenges reported in these
cities. In Shanghai, studies found that doctors in the
CHCs were more likely to refer outpatients to higher
level hospitals in order to reduce their own costs. In
Shenzhen, the hospitals and doctors failed to provide
necessary diagnostic tests for the patients, while doctors
in Mudanjiang encouraged their patients to come back to
see them after 3-4 days immediately, as a new case. As
Shanghai uses the global budget to pay for hospital
admissions, many patients, who needed hospitalization in
the period of approaching fiscal years, were often delayed
in admission to hospital care. In Shenzhen and Mudan-
jiang where case-based payment was used, hospitals and
doctors tended to diagnose their patients as more severe
cases as they actually were, in order to claim higher pay-
ment rates, as found in other countries, or some hospitals
let their inpatients discharged from hospital care and
Table 3 Provider payment methods and their impacts on cost control of health care in selected cities of China
Shanghai Shenzhen Mudanjiang
Provider
payment
methods
￿ Global budget as main method;
￿ Case-based payment for specific
services [10].
￿ Fixed unit rate for inpatient services;
￿ Case-based payment for specific
services [10].
￿ Case-based payment as main method;
￿ Fixed unit rate and FFS for specific
services [10].
OP services/
CHCs
Global budget FFS for outpatient services Fixed unit rate for OP visits.
IP admission Global budget, while case-based
payment used for selected diseases
A fixed unit rate payment for hospital
admissions
Case-based payment for IP admission,
with capped annual ceiling.
Special
cases/
services
Flat daily rate payment for inpatients
with mental health problems
Case-based payment for normal baby
deliveries
FFS for specific services as defined.
Other
cost
control
measures
Rational use
of drugs and
high tech
Drug expenditure as % of total health
revenue of designated hospitals by
health insurance scheme should reduce
year by year;
Regulate the services and prices of high
technology related services [11].
A monitoring and evaluation of
prescribed drugs introduced in all the
public hospitals.
Expenditure of antibiotics should not
be more than 20% of the total drug
expenditures.
Each prescription provides patients with
drugs for only up to 3 days [14].
Service
delivery
management
Strengthening management of service
referring system.
Defining the ratio of outpatient visits
to IP admission to control induced
hospital admissions [13].
Level of case-based payment or unit
rate differs between different levels of
hospitals [15].
Impacts Cost
escalation of
health care
The annual increase rate of health care
expenditure for main health insurance
schemes has been around 11.7% a level
similar to the annual GDP growth rate
in Shanghai [12].
Average health expenditure per the
insured has been maintained at a
stable level (e.g., RBM 646.2 yuan in
2003, RBM 587.3 yuan in 2004)
The increases in OP and IP expenses
were slower than the increase of
average GDP per capita. The 2007
statistical data show that the average
expenditure per hospital admission in
the city was 28% lower than the
national average [16].
Health
insurance
funds
A balanced situation maintained in
terms of incomes and expenditures.
The health insurance fund maintains a
modest surplus annually
The health insurance fund has a
modest surplus.
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these three cities reported less patients’ satisfaction with
the services provided, and the relationship between ser-
vice users and providers has become tense. In addition,
many health insurance fund agencies felt lack of adequate
technical capacity to expand the application of the case-
based payment to cover more diseases.
Separating revenue and expenditure system
In recent years, both central and local governments in
China have significantly increased its health budgets to
urban community health centres/stations, and township
health centres in the rural areas. These facilities are
expected to provide their communities with public
health interventions and essential clinical care. Prior to
the new health system reform, these health facilities
received government health budgets which only covered
a small proportion of total operational costs. Hence,
they had to generate revenue from user fees to cover
financial gaps. Over the past decade, reforming govern-
ment health budget payment has been under way, espe-
cially in the primary health care providers. “Separating
revenue and expenditure system (SRES)” is one of most
popular reforms. Strictly speaking, this should also lie in
the scope of the provider payment methods, as dis-
cussed in the above section. However, we introduces
and discusses it separately, as it addresses an unique
issue of removing perverse incentives to generate reven-
ues through over provision of services, i.e. delinking
incomes from revenue generation in Chinese health
facilities. Under SRES, all the revenues, including
incomes from service charges and drug sale, are paid
into a special government account, while each service
provider will be paid for by the county/district bureau
of finance, according to agreed health budgets [17].
Such an initiative has been seen in Beijing, Chengdu,
Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Yinchuan, and other
Chinese cities (Table 4).
SRES in urban community health centers (CHCs) in Beijing,
Chengdu and Hangzhou
Since 2007 all the CHCs in 18 districts/counties in Beij-
ing have implemented SRES [18]. All the revenues from
these centres are paid into a special account held in the
district/county bureau of finance. All the expenditures
of the centres are paid for according to the agreed bud-
get lines including personnel salaries/subsidies, drugs,
other medical supplies, etc. The income of health work-
ers in these centres are no longer linked to the level of
revenues generated from service charges and/or drug
profit [19].
In Chengdu, Sichuan Province, the principles for
implementing SRES are similar to what Beijing has
done. However, it emphasized that, while recurrent
expenditures should be paid for by the district/county
governments, the infrastructure/capital investment for
the CHCS should be jointly financed by district/county
and Chengdu municipal government [20]. In addition,
the district/county governments should sign an annual
Table 4 Impacts of SERS on health care in selected pilot areas of China
Impacts Beijing Chengdu Hangzhou
Revenues/
expenditures of
CHCs
Proportion of drug expenditure and service
charges declined as % of the total health
expenditure of CHC;
CHCs might not be to receive the payment
from governments timely to cover the
expenditure [12].
District/county governments
increased funding to CHCs;
Ave expenditure per outpatient visit
declined;
CHCs sometimes did not receive
payments from governments or social
health insurance timely
District/county governments increased
financial inputs under SRES;
Ave expenditure of outpatient visit
declined;
CHCs might not receive the payments
from government timely [17,31].
Quantity of
services
provided
The quantity of outpatient visits and public
health services provided in CHCs increased
significantly;
No changes in home visits [14].
The quantity of outpatient visits
increased significantly;
While more NCD patients have been
effectively managed, many NCD
patients bypassed CHCs to seek
tertiary care
The use of CHCs increased;
CHCs provided more public health
services related to NCDs control [18].
Quality of care Patients’ satisfaction with outpatient services
increased, as more patients chose CHC as the
first contact with professional care;
No changes in the management of NCDs [15].
Patients’ satisfaction with the services
increased, resulting in high use rate;
Lack of qualified general practitioners
prevented further increase of quality
of care
Overall satisfaction with the CHC services
increased significantly;
Lack of qualified general practitioners
resulted in slow development of CHCs
[19].
Perceptions of
community
health workers
(CHWs)
SERS can ensure the income of CHWs, and
reduce unnecessary treatments that used to
produce profits for CHCs, making healthcare at
community level more affordable;
SERS does not provide CHWs with financial
incentive to work hard [16].
Most CHWs were satisfied with the
reform, while others were less keen to
provide public health services, as
defined in the SERS.
Increased workload, particularly related to
NCD control, at CHCs may not be
sustainable;
While salaries of CHWs are secured, the
income level did not match the increased
level of workloads. Many CHWs were not
satisfied with their income levels after the
reform [18,31].
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essential clinical services are purchased with agreed bud-
gets. Like Chengdu, Hangzhou applied the same princi-
ples, as Beijing has done, in implementing SRES.
Impacts of SRES initiative
Table 5 presents the impacts of SRES initiative on four
aspects: 1) changes in health expenditure, 2) changes in
quantity of services provided; 3) quality of care, and 4)
perceptions of community health workers. These results
were derived from a review of Chinese literature which
published assessment studies in selected cities where
SRES was piloted. It is apparently clear from the table
that there have been both positive and negative effects
emanating from the initiative in these pilot areas of
China.
Overall speaking, the perverse financial incentive pre-
viously given to the service providers has now been
removed. As a result of that, the over-provision of ser-
vices and over-prescriptions in these health centres have
been rationalized, which has led to improved economic
efficiency and increased patients’ satisfaction with the
services provided. The provision of public health inter-
ventions/services has also been improved, as the initia-
tive has a strong mandate to strengthen public health at
the community level. Many community health workers
have now felt that their incomes have been secured, but
the health workers who used to get high income and/or
bonus payment, linked to their service charges, have
seen the decline of their income levels, while their
workloads, particularly related to public health services,
have increased [23,27,28]. Another concern reported is
that many CHCs could not receive the transfer of the
funding timely from district/county governments which
could affect the operation of service provisions [19,27].
Reforming management of pharmaceutical distribution/
procurement systems
The national health account studies show that China
spent some 5.13% of GDP on health care in 2009, of
which 42% of the expenditure was on pharmaceuticals
[23]. The proportion was one of the highest shares of
pharmaceutical expenditure in total health expenditure
in the world, compared to an average of around 15% in
t h eO E C Dc o u n t r i e s[ 2 9 ] .O n ep r o b l e ma s s o c i a t e dw i t h
excessive use of drug lies in the distribution chain of
pharmaceuticals in China. Since the economic reform
launched in the late 1970s, both the drug distributors
and manufacturers have been allowed to sell drug
directly to hospitals and pharmacies. In other words,
each of the 4,600 pharmaceutical manufacturers in
China can also act as distributors apart from those
12,000 wholesales [9]. They often used proactive ways,
legally or illegally (e.g. kick back to hospital and phar-
macy managers) to promote the sale of their products.
In order to reduce the drug expenditure as percentage
of total health expenditure and unnecessary use of
expensive drugs including antibiotics, the Government
of China, with the support from WHO, has taken a
Table 5 Impacts of SERS on health care in selected pilot areas of China
Impacts Beijing Chengdu Hangzhou
Revenues/
expenditures of
CHCs
Proportion of drug expenditure and service
charges declined as % of the total health
expenditure of CHC;
CHCs might not be to receive the payment
from governments timely to cover the
expenditure [19].
District/county governments
increased funding to CHCs
Ave expenditure per outpatient visit
declined
CHCs sometimes did not receive
payments from governments or social
health insurance timely
District/county governments increased
financial inputs under SRES;
Ave expenditure of outpatient visit
declined;
CHCs might not receive the payments
from government timely [24,27].
Quantity of
services
provided
The quantity of outpatient visits and public
health services provided in CHCs increased
significantly;
No changes in home visits [21].
The quantity of outpatient visits
increased significantly
While more NCD patients have been
effectively managed, many NCD
patients bypassed CHCs to seek
tertiary care
The use of CHCs increased;
CHCs provided more public health
services related to NCDs control [25].
Quality of care Patients’ satisfaction with outpatient services
increased, as more patients chose CHC as the
first contact with professional care;
No changes in the management of NCDs [22].
Patients’ satisfaction with the services
increased, resulting in high use rate.
Lack of qualified general practitioners
prevented further increase of quality
of care
Overall satisfaction with the CHC services
increased significantly;
Lack of qualified general practitioners
resulted in slow development of CHCs
[26].
Perceptions of
community
health workers
(CHWs)
SERS can ensure the income of CHWs, and
reduce unnecessary treatments that used to
produce profits for CHCs, making healthcare at
community level more affordable;
SERS does not provide CHWs with financial
incentive to work hard [23].
Most CHWs were satisfied with the
reform, while others were less keen to
provide public health services, as
defined in the SERS.
Increased workload, particularly related to
NCD control, at CHCs may not be
sustainable;
While salaries of CHWs are secured, the
income level did not match the increased
level of workloads. Many CHWs were not
satisfied with their income levels after the
reform [24,27].
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Page 8 of 13series of actions to improve value for money. One major
reform was to revise the list of national essential drugs
since 2004. The number of Western medicines and
manufactured Chinese drugs reduced from over 2,000 in
the 1990s to only 307 in 2009. In addition, primary
health care facilities including urban health service cen-
tres/stations and township health centres/village health
stations are only allowed to use essential drugs in many
parts of China. Policies on encouraging rational use of
drugs have also been put in place by local health autho-
rities over the past decade. NDRC and provincial
bureaux of pricing have strengthened the regulations of
drugs. Often under the SRES, the health facilities are no
longer allowed to sell drugs with 15-20% mark-up rates
(so-called zero-profit for drug sale in China), which they
normally did before the reform. In addition, the systems
of drug distribution and procurement have also been
reformed over the past decade. Many local health autho-
rities have developed different measures aimed to reduce
the cost of drug procurements. Below are several main
procurement initiatives being used in China [30].
1. Collective bidding
Under this system, all the public hospitals in a province
or city/prefecture use their collective bargaining power
to purchase required drugs for up to three years. The
local health authorities first prepare the purchasing plan
defining clearly what products and quantities of these
products, models of deliveries, and procedures/rules and
then publish their bidding documents. Any qualified
pharmaceutical manufacture or supplier can join the
bidding with indicative price for each product. The
health authority will then review these bids and select
on to sign a contract. In order to be fair, almost all the
review processes follow the principle of blinding evalua-
tion, i.e. the reviewers will not know which bid from
which company. Quality, prices, company’sr e p u t a t i o n ,
and delivery services, are the key indicators for the
review and selection of the bids.
2. Internet-based price bidding
Hospitals and other health service providers publish the
needs of pharmaceutical products and their quantities at
the internet-based pharmaceutical procurement infor-
mation platform. They also indicate the max price of
each product they would be able to pay. Pharmaceutical
manufactures or suppliers, who need first to register
with the platform with relevant information of their
companies, can make an offer to a particular tender.
Often there are three rounds of bidding, and those
offering relative higher prices would be out of the bid-
ding process in the earlier rounds. Such a bidding pro-
cess enables these pharmaceutical suppliers to be more
competitive. Pricing is the most important factor consid-
ered, provided that the quality of product meets reason-
able standards.
3. Commissioned procurements
Commissioned procurements mean that one health
authority or one hospital contracts one pharmaceutical
distribution firm to take a full responsibility for drug
purchasing, supply and storage. Such an arrangement
was often carried under the auspice of the local health
authority (e.g. county or distribute bureau of health), A
number of public hospitals and other health facilities
selected a pharmaceutical distributor through a bidding
process. Once the distributor has been contracted, it
would try to negotiate and purchase drugs, according to
the needs of these health service providers, from differ-
ent pharmaceutical manufactures or wholesales. The
financial profits made will be split between the health
service providers and the contracted distributor, based
on the agreed terms. For example, it is normal for Chi-
nese hospitals to have its own pharmacy within a hospi-
tal promise. Recently, Nanjing Municipal Bureau of
Health in Jiangsu Province decided to contract one large
pharmaceutical distributor to operate the pharmacies for
all the public hospitals.
There are pros and cons of each model introduced
above. The collective bidding system considers a num-
ber of factors, such as quality, price, product delivery,
company reputation and so on, while the internet-based
price bidding puts the factor of price as the most impor-
tant indicator, provided that all the products meet the
standard defined by State Food and Drug Administra-
tion (SFDA) in China. However, the collective bidding
system uses a committee to review the bidding docu-
ments, while the internet-based price bidding uses IT
software to select the winner. The former may be influ-
enced by invested stakeholders, while the latter is prob-
ably more transparent. The commissioned procurements
system has adopted a very different approach that the
health service providers decentralize its decision powers
to contracted pharmaceutical distributor. The impact of
such a system needs to be assessed. Table 6 presents the
results on average expenses of 13 anti-hypotension
drugs (Daily Drug Dosage - DDD) from three cities, one
of which (Guangzhou) used the collective bidding to
purchase these drugs. As we see from the table, the
prices for seven out of 13 drugs from Guangzhou were
significantly cheaper than that of other two cities. Only
two drugs were more expensive in Guangzhou than in
Tianjin and Shanghai, while four in Guangzhou were
between the two prices seen in the two cities. Overall
speaking, the average DDD in Guangzhou was the low-
est - RBM 3.80 yuan, compared to RMB 4.64 yuan in
Shanghai, and RMB 5.12 yuan in Tianjin.
Implementing standard clinical treatment path
Over-provision of services and over-prescription of drugs
have been common in most Chinese hospitals, as
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Page 9 of 13discussed above. Clinical governance has been one of
main challenges in reforming public hospitals in China.
With financial support from the World Bank and Depart-
ment for International Development, UK, and technical
support from National Institute of Clinical Excellence
(NICE), UK, the Ministry of Health, China has selected
six district/counties in China to pilot the experiment of
implementing standard clinical treatment path, aiming to
improve the quality of healthcare, and control cost esca-
lation. QJ district hospital in Chongqing City was chosen
as an intervention hospital, while other two district/
county hospitals in Chongqing City (WL and RC) as con-
trol hospitals. XH first district hospital in Shaanxi Pro-
vince was chosen as intervention groups, while other two
district/county hospitals in Shaanxi Province as control
group. Experts from NICE worked with Chinese clinical
experts and health economics to develop protocols of
standard clinical treatment path for the selected diseases,
and estimated the cost of the treatments, based on evi-
dences available internationally and in China. The
Chongqing study selected ten common diseases, while
the Shaanxi study had 12 common diseases. Appropriate
training workshops were organized by the Chinese
experts involved in the standard/guideline development,
using approved protocols of clinical treatment paths. In
the meantime, the monitoring and evaluation systems
have been established in the six district/county hospitals
for data collection and analysis. The results presented
below were based on the data collected from October
2010 to May 2011, totalling eight months [31].
The impacts of such an initiative were assessed from
three aspects: quality of care, cost of health care, and
technical efficiency of service provision.
1. Quality of care - indicators used to assess the qual-
ity of care, including mainly cure rates and use of drugs
including antibiotics. Due to lack of clear yardsticks and
definitions on what means “cured” or “almost cured, the
comparison of quality of care between pre-intervention
and post-intervention, and between the intervention
group and control group was not meaningful. However,
the use of drugs and particularly antibiotics declined sig-
nificantly in the intervention group than in the control
group. In addition, the two hospitals in the intervention
groups started to use cheap, but effective, antibiotics
again, such as penicillin, as these antibiotics are of first
choices in the clinical treatment paths.
2. Cost of healthcare - average expenditure of hospital
admission for over 50% of selected diseases declined sig-
nificantly after the implementation of the clinical treat-
ment paths in the intervention groups, while this did
not change much in the control group. As for those dis-
eases whose average expenditure of hospital admissions
being increased, an in-depth analysis found that in the
most cases the expenditure related to the use of diagno-
sis and drugs came down, while the cost of other medi-
cal supplies went up, due to high inflation witnessed in
China over the study period. It is clear that irrational
cost escalation of healthcare has to some extent been
control.
3. Efficiency of service provision - indicators related to
average length of hospital stay, average number of days
prior to surgical operation were used to efficiency. The
two comparative studies in Chongqing and Shaanxi
showed declined in the two indicators. That means that
the use of available health resources in the two interven-
tion hospitals has increased.
Table 6 The minimum DDD cost of anti-hypertension medicines in Guangzhou, Tianjin and Shanghai
No. Generic name Average minimum DDD cost
Liwan district, Guangzhou Hebei district, Tianjin Luwan district, Shanghai
1 Losartan 7.65 7.19 7.13
2 Captopril 0.04 3.33 0.39
3 Nitrendipine 0.09 0.05 0.13
4 Enalapril 1.38 1.99 1.61
5 Indapamide 0.72 0.94 0.51
6 Amlodipine 3.27 5.91 4.75
7 Levamlodipine 8.62 7.09 5.89
8 Benazepril 3.41 2.92 3.87
9 Perindopril 3.87 4.03 4.05
10 Fosinopril 5.58 5.55 3.78
11 Valsartan 4.48 5.47 5.24
12 Irbesartan 3.53 3.66 5.74
13 Felodipine 3.14 6.69 5.00
Average 3.80 5.12 4.64
Source of Data: Ministry of Health, China: Report on pharmaceutical purchasing and utilization in primary health institution in China. Beijing; 2009.
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of ten and 12 diseases, respectively in QJ district hospi-
tal of Chongqing, and XH district hospital of Shaanxi. It
implies that reduction of average expenditure of hospital
admission did not reduce the generation of revenue for
these two hospitals and thus would affect the financing
of hospital operations per se.
Way forward for China: what are next steps
Over the past decade China has tried hard to develop
effective measures to control the rapid cost escalation of
healthcare. This is especially important, as the Govern-
ment of China has been implementing the strategy of uni-
versal health coverage and increased significantly financial
input into the health systems strengthening. Experiences
and lessons from many OECD countries over the past half
century would be useful and valuable to the on-going
reform of China’s health care system. They would help
China to look for more effective and evidence-based mea-
sures to tackle the issues, making its universal health cov-
erage more sustainable, though considerations on different
contexts, such as political, economic and cultural factors,
are required in the exercise of “know-how”.
Ensuring high quality and safety of health care is one
precondition in discussing how containing health care
cost. It is very encouraging to see that some Chinese
health facilities, with the technical support from NICE in
England, have adopted the standard clinical paths for the
diagnosis and treatment of their patients. This would
have to ensure the effectiveness of using both diagnostic
tools and clinical interventions, and also avoid the provi-
sion of unnecessary services whose main purpose was to
generate revenues for services providers, and which may
do possible harms, rather than any good, to patients. In
many OECD countries, medical associations, or health
authorities are responsible for updates of the clinical
guidelines and treatment standards, using available evi-
dence. The practice of this kind was not common in
China until recently. Ministry of Health of China have
now recognized the importance of standard clinical
guidelines and made great efforts in setting clinical
guidelines and norms in recently years, particularly for
primary health care facilities handling common diseases
and health problems. Greater efforts should be made to
expand the application of standard clinical paths in more
Chinese hospitals. Furthermore, as presented in this
paper, there is lack of sufficient evidence generated from
these pilot studies to inform further development of poli-
cies and practices. Research on impact assessment,
including monitoring and evaluation, need to be encour-
aged to provide robust evidence and sound knowledge
aimed to improve quality of care in China.
It is critically important and essential to have clinical
guidelines and standards that health service provider
can apply in their practices. However, we all know that
are not sufficient. Appropriate incentives must be devel-
oped to enable service providers to implement good
practices of health services that are accessible and
affordable to the people in need. As reported in this
paper, many local health authorities in China have taken
proactively roles in developing and implementing local
initiatives aimed to provide health service providers with
appropriate mechanisms and incentives for the delivery
of health care services. SRES has become one of widely
used mechanisms, particularly in financing of primary
health care centres in urban cities of China. It seems
that such a mechanism removes a perverse financial
incentive to the over-prescription of diagnosis and drugs
and delinks the income of community health workers
with their revenue generation from service charges and
drug prescriptions. As a consequence, rational prescrip-
tion of diagnosis and drugs can be promoted to make
essential healthcare more affordable. In addition, the
fund for public health inventions can be protected from
such an allocation of government health budgets. How-
ever, measures needs to be developed to ensure that the
transfer of the government health budgets to these
CHCs should be made in timely manner in order to
operate community health centres in an effective and
efficient way. Furthermore, how to develop innovative
incentives (i.e. financial and professional) for community
health workers is facing a new challenge.
As we know, there are no perfect provider payment
m e t h o d se x i s t .C h i n ah a sb e e ni nar i g h td i r e c t i o ni n
reforming provider payment methods to tackle cost
escalation of health care in recent years. Case-based pay-
ment method and flat unit rate payment have been
increasingly used in China. Some cities, like Shanghai,
have also started to use global budget to pay for health
care. The implementation of case-based payment system
in China must be done carefully, as only a number of
diseases were often covered in such a system. The hos-
pitals may shift the costs from the treatment of these
selected diseases to the treatment of other health pro-
blems. In addition, as reported in this paper, there have
also some concerns about the quality of services, under-
treatment, and unnecessary patient referring seen in
some hospitals in order to save the costs of care. That is
not surprising. Our experiences also tell that service
providers often developed their coping strategies to deal
with any reforms or initiatives to regain their invested
interests. It implies that the monitoring and evaluation
of these reforms and their impacts on cost and quality
of healthcare is critically important. And, the health
authorities or health insurance management agencies
should be well prepared to change policies or strategies
every a couple of years. Furthermore, in order to achieve
this, it is imperative to improve significantly technical
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insurance management agencies in China.
Drug expenditure as percentage of total health expen-
diture in China is substantial over the past three dec-
ades. In order to reduce the cost of drug expenditure,
the management of pharmaceutical procurement system
has been radically reformed in recent years, which has
produced a positive impact on bringing the prices of
many drugs down at the point of service delivery, as we
have seen in Guizhou. What China should do more is
that local health authorities (e.g. provincial or municipal
levels) and/or health insurance fund management agen-
c i e sa tt h e s el e v e l so u g h tt ou s et h e i rl a r g ec o l l e c t i v e
bargaining power to get reasonably low prices of drugs,
particularly for most generic ones, as Britain’s NHS and
other OECD countries has been doing. There is still a
room for Chinese health authorities or health insurance
schemes to do more in this area. Challenges facing the
health sector in China include trade protections within
different provinces, weak purchasing capacity of some
health authorities and health insurance management
agencies in less developed regions, and strong lobbying
from international and local pharmaceutical manufac-
turers and wholesale agents. While it is imperative to
i m p r o v et h er a t i o n a lu s eo fd r u gb yd e v e l o p i n ga n d
implementing appropriate incentives for both service
users and providers, it is also equally important to
ensure that these innovative pharmaceutical procure-
ment systems, including those tendering practices aimed
to low drug prices, would not jeopardize or discourage
internal innovation in the Chinese pharmaceutical sec-
tor, and diminish enthusiasm of multi-national drug
firms to participate in the China market. Overall speak-
ing, the systems of drug distribution, procurement and
use in China have been improved gradually.
China’s health system reform is at a critical moment.
Although both central and local governments have
increased their funding for implementing universal
health coverage over the past decade, and an increasing
number of Chinese people have now enjoyed affordable
essential healthcare, the task of cost control in the
health sector is still formidably challenging. Without
effective containment of health care cost, increased
investments in health care would not be transferred to
improved access to health care for Chinese people in
need, and thus the goal of fully implementing universal
health coverage by 2020 would have to be in jeopardy.
More effective actions and measures on cost control are
badly needed in China now than ever.
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